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I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Malcolm Feeley accurately articulated the gravity of the problem of prison
rape when he said, “[i]t may be the single largest shame of the American criminal justice
system, and that’s saying a lot.”1 Human rights groups, such as Stop Prison Rape, say that
prison rape is a form of torture that violates international human rights laws, a “form of
institutionalized brutality [that] is a violation of the United States’ duty to uphold basic
1. Valerie Jenness & Michael Smyth, The Passage and Implementation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act:
Legal Endogeneity and the Uncertain Road from Symbolic Law to Instrumental Effects, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 489, 500 (2011).
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standards of international human rights.”2 But this level of seriousness is not often
reflected in eye-catching national news headlines, nor in connection with the powerful
hashtag of the MeToo movement.3 For the most part, the gravity of this problem is hidden
from the public eye. Legions of incarcerated persons have shared their stories, relating
intensely traumatic memories of rape, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment in attempts to
heal, advocate for change, or to simply be heard.4 Sometimes survivors are not afforded
the opportunity to speak for themselves. Linda Bruntmyer took advantage of the
opportunity to be heard when she testified in front of Congress following her seventeenyear-old son’s death by suicide after being repeatedly raped while incarcerated.5 Her son
was imprisoned for setting a trashcan on fire.6
It is not particularly surprising that prison rape, if and when it is acknowledged, is
not considered to be a pressing issue worthy of widespread public action. Prison rape is
routinely portrayed in popular culture as something that inevitably accompanies being in
jail or prison. Movies and television shows such as The Shawshank Redemption, American
History X, and Orange is the New Black all seem to make use of prison rape, whether
inmate-on-inmate or guard-on-inmate, as a plot point that results in the characters
progressing further along their respective character arcs. 7 Phrases like “don’t drop the
soap” are oftentimes used in jest—an art student created a prison-themed board game
named after the same phrase.8 The prevalence of prison rape is apparently not a secret.9
Whether general attitudes toward the problem are a result of indifference, apathy, or
acceptance that rape and sexual abuse are a part of prison life, the public disregard of the
gravity of prison rape is clear.
In such an environment, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 200310 (PREA) was an
unprecedented effort toward solving a problem that “for too long our society ha[s]
preferred to downplay or ignore.”11 PREA was unanimously passed through the United
2. Id. at 508 (quoting Fact Sheet: Prisoner Rape is Torture Under International Law, JUST DETENTION
INTERNATIONAL (2009), https://justdetention.org/publication/ (follow “Publication” hyperlink; then click on
“Fact Sheets” and scroll down).
3. Me Too, https://metoomvmt.org/about/#history (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) “The ‘me too.’ movement
was founded in 2006 to help survivors of sexual violence, particularly Black women and girls, and other young
women of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing. Our vision from the beginning was to
address both the dearth in resources for survivors of sexual violence and to build a community of advocates,
driven by survivors, who will be at the forefront of creating solutions to interrupt sexual violence in their
communities.”
4. Just Detention International, https://justdetention.org/story/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
5. Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig, Why Americans Don’t Care About Prison Rape: And What Happens When the
Problem Escapes from Behind Bars, THE NATION (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/whyamericans-dont-care-about-prison-rape/.
6. Id.
7. THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Castle Rock Entertainment Oct. 14, 1994); AMERICAN HISTORY X (New
Line Cinema Nov. 1, 1998); Orange is the New Black: A Tittin’ and a Hairin’ (Netflix June 11, 2015).
8. Owen Duffy, Don’t Drop the Soap — The Game That Makes Racism, Homophobia and Prison Rape
FUN!, MEDIUM (Nov. 24, 2018), https://medium.com/@owen_duffy/in-october-this-year-i-went-to-the-annualinternationale-spieltage-game-fair-in-essen-germany-b39ff44b666.
9. Chandra Bozelko, Why We Let Prison Rape Go On, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/opinion/why-we-let-prison-rape-go-on.html.
10. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–09 (2003).
11. Letter from Eric Holder to Frank R. Wolf and Bobby Scott (June 22, 2010),
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/PREAletter.pdf.
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States Senate and the House of Representatives, signed by President George W. Bush, and
enacted, all within two months.12 In 2012, President Barack Obama reaffirmed PREA’s
purpose in a presidential memorandum.13 The goal of eliminating, or at the very least,
reducing prison rape garnered bipartisan support in a Republican-controlled Congress, as
it addressed not only egregious human rights violations, but also the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases, such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).14 PREA’s enactment was a government response that
acknowledged the gravity of prison sexual abuse, a problem that “we have
underestimated” for centuries.15
Although PREA seemingly made its way through Congress and across the
President’s desk without much difficulty, its authors and supporters made significant
compromises to the original legislation to make its passage so seamless.16 The first notable
compromise was the removal of PREA’s ability to create a private cause of action. 17 The
second compromise abandoned any explicit protection of inmates’ Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment.18 Ultimately, these two compromises
effectively eliminated PREA’s metaphorical legal teeth. Courts routinely dismiss claims
brought under PREA and disregard evidence of PREA violations in cases involving Eighth
Amendment claims of sexual abuse.19 In 2012, the Attorney General issued final
standards, or PREA standards, making PREA into enforceable law, but as a result of the
compromises made, PREA imposes minimal consequences on state facilities that violate
its standards.20
Despite the laudable attempt to tackle the issue of prison rape through PREA, the
PREA standards have not been entirely successful in effecting systemic and lasting change
within America’s criminal justice system. This is partially a result of PREA’s power being
severely hindered when courts deem its standards to be irrelevant to the issues they are
charged with deciding. Courts make this determination even when, as evidenced by its
resounding support in Congress, PREA was intended to be a strong vehicle for change.
PREA’s failure to engender lasting change is illustrated by the difficulties that inmates
often face in seeking justice after experiencing rape or sexual abuse in institutional
settings. Despite PREA and its corresponding standards being a tangible set of documents
signed, sealed, and delivered by the people’s elected representatives, courts have not used
them to hold correctional staff or guards accountable for Eighth Amendment violations.
Because PREA’s abilities to protect Eighth Amendment rights are limited, inmates are

12. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 491.
13. Implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 30873 (May 17, 2012).
14. Brenda V. Smith, The Prison Rape Elimination Act: Implementation and Unresolved Issues, 3 CRIM. L.
BRIEF 10 (2008).
15. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 500.
16. Smith, supra note 14, at 11.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Monts v. Greer, No. 5:12-cv-258-MP-GRJ, 2013 WL 5436763 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2013); Colon v.
Kenwall, No. 1:18-CV-840, 2018 WL 5809863 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2018) (dismissing inmate’s claims brought
under PREA because the Act does not give rise to a private cause of action).
20. Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of Sexual Harm, 17
N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 805 (2014).
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forced to seek legal remedies elsewhere. 21 Under laws such as the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), inmates are required to exhaust administrative measures before they
can bring Section 1983 actions, and therefore, receiving remedies for violations of Eighth
Amendment rights is significantly more difficult.22
Courts frequently use various standards such as those articulated by the American
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the American
Correctional Association to supplement their reasoning; courts should likewise use the
PREA standards to guide their decision making. It is not unheard of, nor is it uncommon
for courts to refer to other professional standards, including those promulgated by
organizations possessing notably less legal authority than the United States Congress, in
written opinions for the purpose of assessing and evaluating conduct. 23 Notably, courts
have allowed defendants, oftentimes prison staff and guards, to use PREA standards to
demonstrate that they have not committed an alleged violation.24
The courts use various professional standards to assess constitutional violations.
They also allow PREA standards to be used, although this seems to be restricted to their
use in favor of defendants. Therefore, federal courts should also consider violations by
prison staff of the standards set out in PREA to be relevant as persuasive authority in regard
to private Eighth Amendment claims of sexual abuse or harassment arising from a prison
setting. A neutered version of PREA in which the standards are not given much credence
by the judiciary contradicts the core purpose of PREA and undermines progress in
extinguishing prison rape, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment.
Part II of this Comment will explore the creation of PREA standards and how courts
approach Eighth Amendment claims of sexual abuse and harassment in the prison setting.
Part II begins by describing the events that led to Congress’s creation of legislation that
more explicitly addressed the issue of prison rape. This section will provide support for
the notion that, given the amount of support shown by numerous organizations and
Congress, PREA was enacted for the purpose of directly combating prison rape, as
opposed to merely acting as guidelines to discourage it. But PREA’s history will also
demonstrate that, partially due to late-term opposition from correctional organizations,
PREA was not vested with the power that accompanies creation of a private cause of action
for cruel and unusual punishment claims. Part II will then briefly examine the slowly
changing legal standards courts are using in sexual abuse and harassment cases brought
by inmates against guards and other prison staff. This section will illustrate the difficulty
inmates experience in attempting to bring Eighth Amendment claims and how definitions
of what constitutes sexual abuse and sexual harassment have constantly evolved
throughout history and continue to do so. It will show that courts, by slightly restructuring
established definitions of abuse and harassment, are reinforcing the increased seriousness
shown to the issue of sexual misconduct overall.
21. Arkles, supra note 20, at 802–03.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (stating “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law”); Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
23. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004).
24. See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011).
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Part III will explain why PREA standards are plainly relevant in regard to sexual
abuse and harassment claims brought by inmates and should be given as much credence
as other professional standards referred to in other cases involving constitutional
violations, such as Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Part III will
begin by acknowledging that the Act did not create a private cause of action, but that this
does not render the legislation completely irrelevant. Then, Part III will discuss instances
in which courts have used other standards to assess the quality of mental health care and
of living conditions to determine that constitutional violations existed. Finally, Part III will
depart from the application of standards strictly within institutional settings and consider
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct in regard to Sixth
Amendment claims.
II.

PREA ATTEMPTED TO ADDRESS THE SERIOUS ISSUE OF PRISON RAPE AND SEXUAL
ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS

A. History: The Development and Implementation of Standards Without Teeth
The issue of rape and sexual assault within institutional settings, particularly in
carceral settings, is not just a contemporary problem; critics of United States correctional
facilities have been denouncing the indifference shown toward prison rape for nearly a
century.25 Although precise statistics for the frequency of prison rape are difficult to
obtain, as there was little to no data collected on the issue prior to PREA, about four percent
of prison inmates reported experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization in
the past twelve months.26 This statistic does not account for inmates who choose not to
report abuse or participate in the data-gathering process.
Despite society’s acknowledgment of the issue for at least a century, initiatives to
end rape and sexual abuse in America’s prisons and jails have appeared to gain more
strength in the past few decades. Before PREA was enacted, the Women’s Rights Division
of Human Rights Watch, an international advocacy group, made efforts to combat rape in
women’s prisons by documenting incidents of abuse in women’s correctional facilities.27
Following the Human Rights Watch’s report reflecting data collected on prison rape in
women’s facilities, Congressman John Conyers introduced the Prevention of Custodial
Sexual Assault by Correctional Staff Act in 1999.28 This legislation was to be integrated
into the Violence Against Women Act and proposed creating a database naming
correctional staff who had participated in custodial sexual misconduct and withholding
federal funds from states that failed to criminalize sexual misconduct between correctional
staff and inmates.29 Although this legislation failed, the movement toward enacting similar

25. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 489.
26. Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates,
2011-2012, at 8 (2013). See also 34 U.S.C. § 30301(2) (2003) (stating that, as of 2003, “experts have
conservatively estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have been sexually assaulted
in prison”).
27. Brenda V. Smith, Prison and Punishment: Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 185, 187 (2006).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 188.
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legislation pressed on. In 2002, a Republican Representative for Virginia, Frank Wolf,
proposed the Prison Rape Reduction Act, but it ultimately did not pass, partly as a result
of a lack of involvement of particular organizations, such as the American Correctional
Association, and other groups with direct interests in dealing with prison rape. 30 Although
this legislation did not pass, it received bipartisan support, and would be quickly
reintroduced with modifications in the next year.31
Groups such as the Prison Fellowship Ministries and Just Detention International
continued to advocate for reform targeting the epidemic of prison rape.32 The following
year, Congress enacted PREA into law in an effort to “establish a zero-tolerance standard
for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States.” 33 It passed unanimously
through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives and the Senate, becoming
law on July 25, 2003.34 Additionally, it was signed by a Republican president and, nine
years later, reaffirmed by a Democratic president.35 The resounding bipartisan support
likely contributed to the Act’s speedy passage, demonstrating that Congress found the
legislation to be a necessary part of the solution to the serious problem of prison rape. 36
Eliminating prison rape was the Act’s overarching goal.37 But, in enumerating a
number of shorter-range objectives, PREA also aimed to develop standards that could be
implemented nationally—increasing the accountability of prison staff in addressing prison
rape and protecting inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. 38 PREA was meant to achieve
these goals by disseminating national standards and creating standard definitions of rape,
sexual abuse, and sexual harassment to increase definitional consistency.39 The Act also
offered federal funding to incentivize states to contribute to the effectiveness of PREA.40
All of these efforts were to be propagated in adult correctional facilities, juvenile facilities,
and immigration detention centers.41
To accomplish the aforementioned goals, PREA created the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission (NPREC).42 This body of nine individuals was responsible for
conducting a comprehensive legal and factual study on the impact that prison rape had on
governments and communities.43 The study was issued five years after the initial meeting

30. Id. at 188–89. See Prison Rape Reduction Act of 2002, H.R. 4943, 107th Cong. (2002); Prison Rape
Reduction Act of 2002, S. 2619, 107th Cong. (2002) (These bills were introduced by Representative Frank R.
Wolf and Senator Edward M. Kennedy, respectively.).
31. Smith, supra note 27, at 189.
32. Arkles, supra note 20, at 804.
33. 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1).
34. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 491.
35. 77 Fed. Reg. 30873 (May 17, 2012); Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 490.
36. Smith, supra note 14, at 10–11 (suggesting that, while PREA was meant to deal with human rights abuses,
conservative support was partially a result of the fear of male prison rape, apprehension about homosexuality,
and concern about the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV and AIDS).
37. 34 U.S.C. § 30302(3), (6), (7).
38. Id.
39. Id. §§ 30301–09.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 30307.
42. 34 U.S.C. § 30306.
43. Id.
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of the committee.44 NPREC’s report aimed to provide the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services with recommendations for national standards
regarding the elimination of prison rape.45 In 2009, NPREC issued its recommendations.46
Within a year of NPREC’s submission of the report, the Attorney General would publish
a final rule outlining the national standards under PREA.47 But, in a letter to two members
of the House of Representatives, former Attorney General Eric Holder expressed that the
Department of Justice would not be able to issue national standards within the one-year
deadline, as he “want[ed] to ensure that, once promulgated, the national PREA standards
[would be] successful.”48 In 2012, the Attorney General published the final rules, known
as the National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape or PREA
standards, two years after the deadline and nine years after PREA first became law. 49
While the Attorney General could encourage states to comply with PREA through
financial incentives, the Act specifically applied to and created consequences for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, detention facilities operated by the Department of Homeland
Security, and custodial facilities operated by the Department of Health and Human
Services.50 PREA required that the Attorney General assist states with PREA compliance
by providing “funds for personnel, training, technical assistance, data collection, and
equipment to prevent and prosecute prisoner rape.”51 But, unless a state facility submits
proof showing that it has either been certified and is in full compliance with PREA
standards or assured that it intends to be compliant in the future, the Attorney General is
required to withhold five percent of all federal funding for prison purposes normally
received within a fiscal year.52 Although the possibility of withheld funding may influence
some state correctional facilities to be PREA compliant, as of 2011, only 2.9% of most
state prison budgets consist of federal funding.53
In response to the lack of reliable data on the incidence of prison rape, the Bureau
of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice (BJS) received fifteen million dollars
between 2004 and 2010 to collect annual data on prison rape and sexual abuse in order to
create a comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the issue. 54 This yearly
comprehensive report was to consist of a random sampling of at least ten percent of the
nation’s federal, state, and county prisons, with a requirement that the report include data

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Arkles, supra note 20, at 805.
47. 34 U.S.C. § 30307.
48. Letter from Eric Holder to Frank R. Wolf and Bobby Scott (June 22, 2010),
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/PREAletter.pdf.
49. 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012); Arkles, supra note 20, at 805.
50. 34 U.S.C. § 30307.
51. Id. § 30305(a).
52. Id. § 30307(e)(2)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 115.401(a) (2012) (Additionally, detention facilities are also subject to
audits once every three years.).
53. National Association of State Budget Officers, State Spending for Corrections: Long-Term Trends and
Recent
Criminal
Justice
Policy
Reforms
3
(2013)
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-b7500fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Issue%20Briefs%20/State%20Spending%20for%20Corrections.pdf.
54. 34 U.S.C. § 30303 (2003).
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that was representative of each of the fifty states.55 Under PREA, the BJS had the authority
to choose what actions or events garnered data collection and how to define those actions
or events.56 The latest BJS report analyzed statistics not only regarding the incidence of
prison rape, but also nonconsensual sexual acts, abusive sexual contact, staff sexual
misconduct, and staff sexual harassment.57 The broader definition of prison rape the BJS
chose to adopt for purposes of data collection, which includes any form of sexual
misconduct, reflects a change in the approach to possibly illegal conduct, whether it be by
inmate or staff, that serves no penological purpose.58
B. What PREA’s Final Rule Requires of Prisons
When sexual abuse and sexual harassment do occur, inmates may file a PREA
complaint in accordance with the National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Prison Rape Under the Prison Rape Elimination Act.59 All correctional agencies must
make multiple internal ways of privately reporting incidents available to victims, including
at least one method of outside reporting.60 Victims can report incidents in a variety of
ways, including verbally, in writing, anonymously, or by third parties.61 Following a
report, the correctional agency is required to make a final decision within ninety days of
the grievance filing.62 Furthermore, agency staff are required to immediately report any
“knowledge, suspicion, or information regarding an incident of sexual abuse or sexual
harassment.”63 The rules also outline agency responsibilities following a report, some of
which require that action be taken to protect the inmate from both imminent and further
abuse or harassment and also that the individual who reported an incident be shielded from
retaliation.64
After an inmate reports an incident, PREA standards mandate that the agency
conduct an investigation.65 The investigators must collect and preserve evidence, and the
investigation should be documented in a written report, which the agency is to preserve
for a minimum of five years.66 Agencies are required to refer any substantiated allegations
that may be criminal in nature to law enforcement.67 The evidentiary standard for

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Ramona R. Rantala, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Victimization Reported by Adult Correctional
Authorities, 2012-15 2 (2018) (The data that BJS gathered was based on “reported sexual violence from
administrative records and allegations of sexual victimization directly from victims through surveys of inmates
in prisons and jails and surveys of youth held in juvenile correctional facilities.”).
58. See also Smith, supra note 27, at 192.
59. 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012).
60. Id. § 115.51(a), (b).
61. Id. § 115.51(c).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 115.5 (To clarify, “agency means the unit of a State, local, corporate, or nonprofit authority,
or of the Department of Justice, with direct responsibility for the operation of any facility that confines inmates,
detainees, or residents, including the implementation of policy as set by the governing, corporate, or nonprofit
authority”); § 115.52(d)(1).
63. Id. § 115.61(a).
64. 28 C.F.R. § 115.62–68.
65. Id. § 115.71.
66. Id. § 115.71(c), (f)(2), (i).
67. Id. § 115.71(h).
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administrative PREA investigations does not exceed the preponderance of the evidence
standard.68
If an investigation reveals a violation of agency sexual abuse and harassment
policies, PREA standards allow for agency discretion as to whether to impose disciplinary
action and what discipline to inflict.69 An agency may terminate the staff member or
impose some other disciplinary sanction, but if a staff member is found to have violated
sexual abuse policy, then “[t]ermination shall be the presumptive disciplinary sanction.”70
Curiously, these standards require that a report be made to law enforcement only when a
staff violation of the agency sexual abuse or sexual harassment policies results in a
termination or resignation.71
PREA is an explicit acknowledgement by the federal government that prison rape
and sexual abuse is a problem demanding a meaningful solution. The trauma of
experiencing sexual abuse or sexual harassment, which is oftentimes compounded by
significant stigma, particularly for incarcerated men, was serious enough to warrant
congressional action.72 It was an effort to combat the infringement of inmates’ Eighth
Amendment rights in a system plagued by sexual violence. 73 But while Congress may
have intended PREA to be a vehicle for widespread systemic change, the Act did not create
a private cause of action or remedy.74 Given that PREA’s predecessors, such as the
Prevention of Custodial Sexual Assault by Correctional Staff Act and the Prison Rape
Reduction Act, failed to get through Congress, PREA’s supporters made concessions to
secure its passage.75 Yet one of PREA’s expressed purposes is to protect Eighth
Amendment rights, making the Act’s lack of legal teeth somewhat contradictory. 76 This
contradiction suggests that the Act’s original purpose was to create an avenue by which
inmates could pursue rape and sexual assault claims, but that the Act’s force was reduced
as a result of significant push-back.77 Because of these concessions, an inmate cannot use
PREA to assert claims of rape, sexual abuse, or sexual harassment, but must bring such
claims under the Eighth Amendment or other legal avenues.78 As a result of defenses like
qualified immunity for correctional staff and courts’ disagreement as to what constitutes
sexual abuse, bringing successful cruel and unusual punishment claims can be incredibly
difficult for inmates.79
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires that inmates exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, poses another
hurdle to successful Eighth Amendment claims.80 More specifically, inmates must exhaust
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 115.72.
28 C.F.R. § 115.76(a).
Id. § 115.76(b).
Id. § 115.76(d).
See 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–09.
Id.
Arkles, supra note 20, at 802–03.
Smith, supra note 14, at 11.
34 U.S.C. § 30302.
Smith, supra note 14, at 11.
34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–09 (PREA does not create a private cause of action.).
See Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty. Ohio, 915 F.3d 1087 (6th Cir. 2019).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
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any and all of the correctional facility’s grievance procedures for filing grievances before
bringing constitutional claims, as this process “gives prisoners an effective incentive to
make full use of the prison grievance process and accordingly provides prisons with a fair
opportunity to correct their own errors.”81 Therefore, an inmate must file a PREA
complaint unless the prison rules specify otherwise, then wait for the correctional agency
to conduct an investigation and decide what action to take as a result of its findings before
bringing an Eighth Amendment claim.
The PLRA was enacted in 1996 in an attempt to reduce prisoner litigation following
a significant increase in the number of inmates filing suits.82 It mandates that inmates must
exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a claim in federal court under Section
1983 or other federal law.83 Although administrative procedures vary from state to state
and among municipalities, even PREA standards seem to communicate the idea that
avoidance of litigation is prioritized over the Act’s explicit goal of protecting inmates’
Eighth Amendment rights. Despite the risk of being subjected to retaliation from other
inmates or correctional staff, inmates are required to pursue complaints against staff
members alleging conduct for which they could be terminated through an internal process
administered by the staff members’ co-workers, which may be confidential in theory, but
is unlikely to be so in practice.84 Once an inmate has completed all administrative steps,
which could take several months and place the inmate at risk of retaliation, the inmate
faces the challenge of seeking relief in federal court.85
C. Constitutional Standards of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Prison Are Evolving
i. Sexual Abuse and Harassment Claims in Prison Settings
Inmates who are sexually abused or harassed most frequently seek relief through
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or through what is commonly referred to as
a Bivens action.86 An action filed under Section 1983 creates a civil cause of action for
violations of constitutional rights by state officials. 87 Just as Section 1983 claims allow
inmates in state facilities to sue state correctional staff for constitutional violations, Bivens
actions, which derive from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, allow for federal inmates to bring claims against federal staff.88 Since these are
civil claims, remedies can include the award of damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive

81. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 (2006).
82. Ann H. Mathews, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive
Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 538 (2002).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
84. 28 C.F.R. § 115.76(b).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
86. Megan Coker, Note, Common Sense About Common Decency: Promoting a New Standard for Guardon-Inmate Sexual Abuse Under the Eighth Amendment, 100 VA. L. REV. 437, 440 (Apr. 2014). Following the
decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), it is unclear whether Bivens actions are still available to
federal prisoners bringing claims of sexual abuse.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
88. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Coker,
supra note 86, at 440–41.
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relief.89
The Supreme Court has been relatively clear in the way it treats Eighth Amendment
claims by providing a two-pronged test to determine if there has been a rights violation.
The test applies in all Eighth Amendment cases except those involving use of force
allegations. The Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment protects against “‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain” that
are “‘totally without penological justification.’”90 And while, “the Constitution ‘does not
mandate comfortable prisons,’ . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones.”91
First, an inmate must satisfy the objective component of the two-pronged test by
proving that the petitioner experienced an “objectively, sufficiently serious” injury, which
is determined by using evolving or “contemporary standards of decency.”92 Physical
injuries are typically found to satisfy this objective component.93 While psychological
injury resulting from rape or other violence can be sufficient to satisfy the objective
standard, courts have not consistently considered psychological injury resulting from other
types of sexual abuse to meet this component.94 The Eighth Amendment also “imposes
duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement.” 95
Therefore, if the claim involves a failure to protect an inmate from injury, an inmate must
show that facility conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm.96
The second prong of the two-pronged test is subjective and determines whether the
accused prison official acted or failed to act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”97
Courts have typically found the subjective component is satisfied when abuse by prison
officials occurs “without a legitimate penological purpose.” 98 In regard to failures to
protect inmates from abuse, deliberate indifference requires “something more than mere
negligence”;99 it requires a showing of subjective awareness that there was an excessive
risk and that the risk was disregarded.100
In recent years, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been impacted by the passage
of PLRA, which makes it more challenging for inmates to bring successful damages claims
of violations of Eighth Amendment rights that involve sexual abuse or sexual
harassment.101 Congress amended PLRA in 2013, to include a limitation on the types of
injury that could trigger a federal civil action, barring damages for an alleged mental or
emotional injury without physical injury.102 This amendment made it difficult for courts

89. Coker, supra note 86, at 440–41.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
91. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
92. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1992).
93. Coker, supra note 86, at 445.
94. Id. at 451–53.
95. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
96. Id. at 834.
97. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.
98. Coker, supra note 86, at 445.
99. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
100. Id. at 835–37 (It should be noted that the Supreme Court reiterated that the deliberate indifference
standard is not appropriate for cases that involve excessive uses of force.).
101. Coker, supra note 86, at 441.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (stating “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
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to determine how to deal with allegations of sexual abuse that did not involve a physical
component.103 And while PLRA appears to focus mostly on the severity of the injury
inflicted, the Supreme Court has articulated that injury is merely a single component of
Eighth Amendment claims.104 Of equal importance is the motivation behind inflicting the
injury: whether it had a penological purpose or was instead to “maliciously and sadistically
[] cause harm.”105 Correctional staff are mandated by the Eighth Amendment to “ensure
that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,’” suggesting that rape and
sexual assault have no justifiable penological purpose. 106 Furthermore, courts have
explicitly stated that sexual assault in correctional institutions has no legitimate purpose
and is, therefore, malicious and sadistic.107
Moreover, PLRA’s definitions of sexual abuse and harassment are different and
significantly narrower from those of PREA.108 Under PLRA, a “sexual act” is limited to
sexual contact, penetration, or intentional touching.109 PREA defines sexual abuse of an
inmate by a staff member to include “any attempt, threat, or request” to engage in sexual
conduct, “any display by a staff member” of private parts of the body, and voyeurism. 110
PREA definitions also include sexual harassment, which involves “repeated and
unwelcome sexual advances” and “repeated verbal comments or gestures of a sexual
nature.”111 PREA standards more accurately reflect contemporary and evolving standards
of decency, as demonstrated by its more expansive sexual abuse and harassment
definitions.112 By creating these definitions, PREA promotes definitional consistency. It
also reflects societal opinions as to the seriousness of sexual abuse and harassment,
whether in carceral settings or not.113 Both of these aspects of PREA render it a useful
tool that courts could use in assessing inmates claims of Eighth Amendment sexual abuse.
But while courts appear to be considering injury more broadly as an act that inflicts harm
without a legitimate purpose, the tests that courts continue to employ make bringing

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18)”).
103. Coker, supra note 86, at 441–42.
104. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
105. Id.
106. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
107. See Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, at 1050 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, at
1212–13 (10th Cir. 2003).
108. § 1997e; 28 C.F.R. § 115.6.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (1998) (There have been no amendments or alterations made to any of the definitions
in this section since 1994 despite the Supreme Court’s declaration that “contemporary standards of decency” be
applied in addressing Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claims.).
110. 28 C.F.R. § 115.6 (“Voyeurism by a staff member . . . means an invasion of privacy of an inmate,
detainee, or resident by staff for reasons unrelated to official duties, such as peering at an inmate who is using a
toilet in his or her cell to perform bodily functions; requiring an inmate to expose his or her buttocks, genitals, or
breasts; or taking images of all or part of an inmate’s naked body or of an inmate performing bodily functions.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See also Bromell v. Idaho Dep’t of Corrs., No. CV05-419-N-LMB, 2006 WL 3197157, at *4 (D. Idaho
Oct. 31, 2006) (acknowledging that “where uninvited sexual contact is totally without penological justification,
even though it does not produce serious injury, it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering, which always
violates contemporary standards of decency”).
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successful sexual abuse and harassment claims difficult for inmates.
ii. The Verbal Abuse+ Test
A restrictive interpretation of the Farmer test used by lower courts is the Verbal
Abuse+ Test.114 This test is narrow and oftentimes yields negative results for inmates
seeking relief.115 Even if an inmate experiences repeated, persistent verbal sexual
harassment from a guard, courts have consistently held that, absent physical contact that
constitutes more than de minimis injury, the harm caused by such harassment does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.116 Some have referred to this standard as the
“verbal abuse plus” test.117 Requiring that harassment be accompanied by more than de
minimis physical contact has made it difficult for inmates alleging constitutional violations
based on sexual harassment alone to succeed in court.118 With a seemingly low likelihood
that sexual harassment will be deemed a constitutional violation, guards are given latitude
to inflict verbal harassment on inmates as long as said harassment is not accompanied by
physical action. And while inmates can proceed through administrative remedies and file
claims alleging PREA violations, these claims are not guaranteed to result in disciplinary
action against correctional staff.119 When sexual harassment that takes place in
correctional settings is considered to inflict minimal injury on its victims and judicial
remedies are difficult to secure, PREA’s goal of eliminating sexual harassment in carceral
settings is further impeded.
In Jones v. Heyns, the District Court for the Western District of Michigan
demonstrated the challenges presented by the verbal abuse+ test. 120 In Heyns, Anthony
Jones, an inmate incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), sued
several MDOC employees alleging that Corrections Officer Shreve sexually harassed him
in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.121 Jones was leaving the prison cafeteria
with another inmate named Walker, when Shreve said, “Jones, I always see you and
Walker, walking together. I wonder know [sic] which one of you are the boy, and who’s
the girl,” causing Shreve and another corrections officer to begin laughing.122 Jones
requested that Shreve not refer to him as a boy, as this implies that someone is homosexual,
which can increase an inmate’s risk of harm.123 Jones then filed a grievance alleging that
Shreve had violated MDOC policy.124 Shreve denied making the comment and Captain
Makara issued inmate Jones a Class II misconduct charge for filing an unfounded
grievance.125 Lieutenant Randle found Jones guilty of the misconduct, which Jones
114. James E. Robertson, The Verbal Abuse+ Test: A “Safe Harbor” for Sexual Harassment in Correctional
Institutions, CORR. L. REP., Aug.–Sept. 2019, at 25.
115. Jones v. Heyns, No. 1:12-CV-1341, 2013 WL 353762 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013).
116. Id.
117. Robertson, supra note 114, at 26.
118. Id. at 26.
119. 28 C.F.R. § 115.76.
120. Heyns, 2013 WL 353762.
121. Id. at *1–2.
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Heyns, 2013 WL 353762, at *1.
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claimed was not unusual, as inmates were often charged with misconduct for filing
grievances.126 In addition to alleging retaliation and violation of his First Amendment
rights, Jones claimed that the alleged sexual harassment violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.127
The court acknowledged that “sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a
corrections officer can never serve a legitimate penological purpose and may well result
in severe physical or psychological harm” and “constitute the ‘unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’”128 While the court was obviously aware that sexual harassment can
result in severe psychological harm to prisoners, it nevertheless employed the verbal
abuse+ test.129 Because circuit courts have considered psychological pain insufficient to
satisfy the objective component of a constitutional claim of sexual harassment, the court
used the test to conclude that the harassment allegedly inflicted on Jones by Shreve was
insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment violation.130 The court dismissed Shreve’s
behavior as simply unprofessional, “but . . . not ris[ing] to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.”131
The sexual harassment that Jones allegedly sustained seemed to be an isolated
incident, which is not to suggest that it is any less serious. But inmates who have brought
similar claims who have endured repeated, persistent harassment have also had their
claims summarily dismissed under the verbal abuse+ test.132 And if administrative
remedies do not rectify the harmful behavior, inmates are confined to a setting in which
the harassment is virtually inescapable. Congress, through PREA, condemned sexual
harassment in prisons as well as rape and other physical abuse, and, through its explicit
inclusion of sexual harassment, supported the notion that such harassment is capable of
inflicting serious psychological harm and is therefore unacceptable in correctional
settings.133
iii. The Further Evolution of the Farmer Test
Some courts appear to be shifting away from the narrow verbal abuse+ test,
suggesting that incremental changes are taking place in courts’ approaches to inmate
claims of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violations. In Rafferty v.
Trumbull County Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals avoided applying the verbal
abuse+ test by framing what arguably could be termed sexual harassment as sexual abuse
in order to satisfy the requirement that there be physical touching. 134
In Rafferty, two female inmates, Sherman and Rafferty, were incarcerated at the
Trumbull County Jail from 2013 to 2014.135 In 2014, Correctional Officer Drennen
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
Id.
Heyns, 2013 WL 353762 at *4.
Id.
Robertson, supra note 114, at 27.
28 C.F.R. § 115.6.
Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty. Ohio, 915 F.3d 1087 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1091.
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demanded that Sherman expose herself to him on several occasions. 136 Drennen also
ordered Sherman to masturbate for him on multiple occasions.137 While Drennen never
physically touched Sherman, she felt that she had to comply with his commands.138 Both
of the women, who were cellmates, sued, alleging Fourth and Eighth Amendment
violations.139
In outlining the components of the Eighth Amendment test for sexual abuse claims,
the court noted that the objective component of the test is meant to be “a ‘contextual’
inquiry that is ‘responsive to contemporary standards of decency’” and that courts must
interpret the Eighth Amendment using “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’”140 Despite the lack of physical contact between Sherman
and Drennen, the court referred to the harm as sexual abuse and found that it was
sufficiently serious, satisfying the objective component of the test.141 Interestingly, the
court construed Drennen’s acts as sexual abuse because it found that physical contact
occurred when the officer demanded that Sherman touch herself.142 And, because inmates
cannot legally consent to sexual relations with prison staff, Drennen could not use
Sherman’s acquiescence to his demands as a defense.143
The Sixth Circuit could have construed Drennen’s behavior as sexual harassment,
which would have most likely rendered Sherman and Rafferty’s claims unsuccessful, as
the objective component would not have been satisfied due to the lack of physical
touching.144 The definitions of sexual abuse and sexual harassment appear to be malleable,
as the distinctions between sexual abuse absent physical touching and sexual harassment
are somewhat vague. Definitional inconsistencies in how courts may define these terms
can have significant negative impacts on inmates seeking legal relief, as it makes
predicting the receipt of relief more difficult.145 Because PREA standards clearly define
both sexual harassment and sexual abuse, they offer a solution to the issue of definitional
inconsistency.146 While PREA seems to include the definition of sexual harassment within
its definition of sexual abuse, PREA’s inclusion of sexual harassment at all suggests that
such behavior within carceral settings is contrary to contemporary standards of decency,
capable of inflicting serious injury, and should not be tolerated.147

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1092.
140. Id. at 1094 (quoting Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d
1220, 1227 (6th Cir. 1987)).
141. Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1095.
142. Id. at 1096.
143. Id.
144. While courts seem to apply a heightened standard to inmate Eighth Amendment claims in order to satisfy
the objective component, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defines sexual harassment as,
“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual
nature” See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (last visited Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm (emphasis added).
145. For a brief discussion of the impact of definitional consistency, see Coker, supra note 86, at 442–44.
146. 28 C.F.R. § 115.6.
147. Id. (The definition of sexual harassment is a subpart of the definition of voyeurism, which PREA has
categorized as sexual abuse, despite the lack of physical touching inherent in voyeurism).
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In another example demonstrating the increased seriousness attributed by courts to
the harm that sexual abuse and harassment can inflict on inmates, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that “attempt[ing] to draw a categorical distinction between verbal
and physical harassment is arbitrary.”148 In Beal v. Foster, Beal brought a suit under
Section 1983 against the prison warden (Foster) and a prison guard (Schneider), alleging
that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment after the guard repeatedly
subjected him to sexual harassment.149 The alleged harassment included repeated sexual
comments suggesting that Beal was homosexual and the defendant guard intentionally
urinating in front of Beal and other inmates.150 The district court dismissed the claim at
screening, stating that verbal harassment alone does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.151 The Seventh Circuit viewed the lower court’s reasoning as clearly
erroneous, noting that verbal harassment can be as severe as “physical brutalization of
prisoners by guards” and that cruel and unusual punishment may be physical or
psychological.152 The court acknowledged that it had previously held that “simple verbal
harassment” is not cruel and unusual punishment, but recognized the vagueness of the term
“simple.”153 It clarified that “simple” was meant to mean “fleeting,” distinguishing
between verbal harassment that makes a lasting impact and harassment that does not.154
The court noted the repetitiveness of the harassment, the prison guard’s rank as a Sergeant,
and the increased risk of bodily harm to the inmate as a result of the guard’s comments.155
Despite the court’s attempt at clarification between simple and complex harassment,
it seems that its assessment of the impact the harassment imposes on a prisoner continues
to be extremely personal and subjective, eluding definitional consistency. 156 The court
concluded that the district court erred, but it points out that, simple or complex, verbal
harassment claims typically do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.157
Still, some of these claims do rise to the level of cruel and unusual, but the court did not
articulate a clear and concise rule or standard to help in making this determination.
Regardless of the definitional ambiguity, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the seriousness
of psychological harm and that such harm can be inflicted through both physical and verbal
means.158 PREA, which acknowledges the damage sexual abuse and harassment can have
on inmates, reinforces this court’s approach of assessing what types of injuries satisfy the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment test.159
148. Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 2015).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 357–58.
151. Id. at 357. ‘Screening’ refers to “the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution
to be diverted.” See Definition of Screening, LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/screening
(last visited May 31, 2020).
152. Id. at 358.
153. Beal, 803 F.3d at 358.
154. Id.
155. Id. (It is also important to note that the inmate filed a grievance with the prison and that grievance was
upheld, but it is unknown whether this resulted in any punishment of the defendant.).
156. Id. at 358.
157. Id.
158. Beal, 803 F.3d at 357.
159. Id.
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Both Rafferty and Beal illustrate changing approaches to inmate claims of Eighth
Amendment sexual abuse and harassment. Increasingly, there seems to be a trend of
moving away from an absolute requirement that an inmate sustain a physical assault
defined as contact between two individuals. Instead, there is movement towards expanding
the objective component of the Eighth Amendment test to encompass psychological harm
resulting from either sexual abuse or harassment.160 As these standards continue to evolve,
it becomes necessary for courts to reference sources that can inform them of how to define
“contemporary standards of decency.”161 PREA is a source that courts can use to traverse
these evolving standards and tests. Given that PREA was developed by Congress with the
input of numerous organizations and that the final rule published by the Attorney General
was informed by ample research and data on the issue, the Act is highly relevant. 162
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims Given More Serious Consideration
Some cases acknowledge PREA’s relevance. In Zollicoffer v. Livingston, the
plaintiff was a transgender inmate who had been housed in seven different Texas prison
units.163 She experienced sexual assault or abuse in all seven facilities, despite satisfying
administrative reporting requirements and requesting that protective measures be taken to
prevent future assaults.164 The plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action against the
Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging
deliberate indifference.165
While the case was deferred for decision based on the issue of whether the defendant
was shielded by qualified immunity, the district court determined that the defendant could
be liable under Section 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s risk of being
sexually abused.166 In addition to the PREA standards being incorporated into TDCJ’s
policies, the defendant was also Chair of the Standards Committee for the American
Correctional Association and “personally participated in PREA hearings.” 167 The court
found the defendant’s involvement and awareness of the PREA standards important
enough to constitute knowledge (or that he should have had knowledge) and deliberate
indifference towards the heightened risk of sexual assault within prison.168 Furthermore,
the court noted the extremely high rates of sexual abuse within Texas correctional
facilities, referencing the statistics that have to be reported to BJS in order for a state to
receive funding through PREA.169
Although this case involved a correctional official who had a direct link to PREA,

160. See Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (Blackmun, H., concurring) (“I am unaware of any precedent of this Court to
the effect that psychological pain is not cognizable for constitutional purposes. If anything, our precedent is to
the contrary.”).
161. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 2, 8, 9.
162. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 1, at 491.
163. 169 F. Supp. 3d 687, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
164. Id. at 690.
165. Id. at 689.
166. Id. at 696.
167. Id.
168. Zollicoffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 696.
169. Id. at 690–91.
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Zollicoffer is a good example of how courts could and should reference PREA standards.
If state correctional facilities are receiving funding through PREA, then it is not
unreasonable to assume that they should have knowledge of the standards and be held
accountable when a violation occurs. The court here considered PREA highly relevant,
making its determination partially based on the existence of PREA standards and the BJS
statistics that were a direct result of PREA. 170 While this case dealt specifically with
deliberate indifference, it illustrates the importance and relevancy of PREA to defendants’
knowledge of the risk of sexual assault in regard to Eighth Amendment claims of sexual
abuse, which can be brought under Section 1983.
III. RELEVANCE OF PREA STANDARDS TO PRIVATE CLAIMS OF CARCERAL SEXUAL
ABUSE
A. No Right to Private Cause of Action, But Completely Irrelevant?
As mentioned previously, claims brought under PREA will not succeed because
PREA did not create a private cause of action. But while this conclusion is undisputed, it
is erroneous to infer that PREA standards are entirely irrelevant to sexual abuse claims
brought under the Eighth Amendment. Njos v. United States is one of many examples in
which a court immediately dismissed a claim because an inmate, who was proceeding pro
se, mistakenly brought a claim under PREA. 171 The plaintiff brought Eighth Amendment
claims, in addition to claims under the Federal Torts Claim Act and Bivens, alleging that
he did not receive adequate psychological treatment after being raped by his cellmate. 172
The court dismissed the claims brought under PREA, simply stating that the
standards do not give rise to a private cause of action and that any claims brought under
them must fail.173 The plaintiff argued that he had not made PREA claims, but used PREA
standards to define “evolving standards of decency” to support his Eighth Amendment
claim.174 Although the court noted this argument, it chose not to address whether or not
PREA standards could or should be used as support for Eighth Amendment claims, but
merely stated that PREA did not create a private cause of action. 175 The Eighth
Amendment claims failed for other reasons, but the court allowed the inmate, who was
proceeding pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint.176
The court’s failure to address whether PREA standards are relevant to this Eighth
Amendment claim disregards the possibility that the standards may be used to support such
claims and should not be unceremoniously dismissed as automatically irrelevant. Many
state facilities have either adopted PREA standards or adapted and incorporated them into
their own policies, signaling that the standards are important to the operation of the
facility.177 PREA was meant to eliminate prison rape by outlining standards for
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
No. 3:14-CV-1960, 2016 WL 1720816 (M.D. Penn. Apr. 29, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Njos, 2016 WL 1720816, at *5.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Just. Assistance, FY 2017 LIST OF CERTIFICATION AND ASSURANCE
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correctional staff on how to handle the occurrence of sexual abuse or harassment.178 Given
PREA’s intent and recency, the inmate’s use of PREA standards in the Njos case to define
“evolving standards of decency” seems logical.179 Even if PREA standards cannot, alone,
be used to prove such an evolving standard, they can certainly bolster such an argument.
They do not create a private cause of action and therefore cannot be used to file a claim.180
But this does not and should not render PREA standards irrelevant in their entirety.
Demonstrating just how relevant PREA can be, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana deemed the standards to be significant enough to reference when
approving a consent judgment to remedy constitutional violations, some of which included
allegations of sexual abuse and assault.181 The case of Jones v. Gusman involved a class
action lawsuit, which was filed against the Orleans Parish Prison and the City of New
Orleans, alleging a number of unconstitutional conditions within the facility. 182 As a
result, there was a proposed consent judgment.183 In 2009, the Department of Justice
conducted a site visit and found that there were unlawful conditions pertaining to “inmate
violence, staff use of force, mental health care, and environmental condition.” 184
The court noted that PREA does not create a cause of action, but that the facility had
committed several PREA violations.185 The parties involved were in agreement that the
consent judgment should be tailored to address the PREA violations. 186 While the
resulting agreement addressed many issues within the facility, it is important to note that
the court found PREA standards sufficiently relevant in attempting to rectify the various
identified constitutional violations, despite its inability to create a cause of action. This
would suggest that, if the facility was noncompliant with the consent decree, PREA
standards would also be relevant in regard to assessing and rectifying that noncompliance.
While Gusman involved the drafting and enforcement of a consent decree for
numerous constitutional violations, including Eighth Amendment violations, the decree
specifically sought to prevent further sexual abuses within the prison. 187 This case
illustrates just how PREA could be used when addressing Eighth Amendment violations
by using PREA standards as one piece of supporting relevant evidence; violations of
PREA standards alone may not be sufficient to prove Eighth Amendment violations, but
may offer further support to show that “contemporary standards of decency” were
violated.188
Moreover, courts have been inconsistent in their determination of PREA standards’
relevancy, reinforcing the notion that the standards do offer some level of relevancy. Many
inmates have tried to bring claims of sexual abuse against prison staff by alleging PREA
SUBMISSIONS FOR AUDIT YEAR 3 OF CYCLE 1 (2017).
178. 34 U.S.C. § 30302.
179. 2016 WL 1720816, at *2.
180. 34 U.S.C. § 30301.
181. See Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 454 n.488 (E.D. La. 2013).
182. Id. at 423–25.
183. Id. at 426–27.
184. Id. at 424.
185. Id. at 454 n.448.
186. See Jones, 296 F.R.D. at 454 n.488.
187. Id. at 431.
188. Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 10, 22–23.
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violations, as opposed to Eighth Amendment violations, which can be more difficult to
prove.189 Courts have summarily dismissed such claims brought under PREA because, as
stated previously, PREA did not in fact create a private right of action.190 But, while
violations of PREA may not be adjudicated in isolation in the court system, such violations
should not be considered irrelevant to sexual abuse claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment—one of PREA’s explicitly stated goals was to reduce and eliminate the
occurrence of Eighth Amendment violations in prisons.191
Courts appear to make PREA’s relevancy dependent upon whether PREA is being
used as either a sword or a shield. Defendants in Eighth Amendment sexual abuse cases,
typically prison staff, have been allowed to use PREA as a shield, while inmates have been
barred from using it as a sword, specifically, because PREA did not create a private cause
of action.192 Congress enacted PREA to protect inmates from rape and sexual abuse, thus
it appears as though the courts are flouting Congress’s intentions through such inconsistent
treatment of parties with regard to the application of PREA. By allowing defendants to use
PREA to their advantage, the courts have equipped prison staff with yet another means of
protection from accountability.193
Courts have enabled prison staff to use PREA as a shield, deeming PREA standards
relevant in regard to a defense. For example, prison officials have cited PREA and their
duty to reduce prison rape when justifying prohibiting an inmate from having prayer oils,
despite the defendants never articulating a logical connection between PREA and their
actions; in an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment case, prison officials used PREA to
justify withholding hormone treatment to a transgender inmate, as they claimed it would
increase the inmate’s risk of being raped; and prison officials have employed PREA
compliance as a defense against various types of inmate claims, despite courts’ rulings that
compliance with standards, such as American Correctional Association standards, does
not automatically give rise to the conclusion that a violation has not occurred. 194
This treatment of PREA suggests that, while PREA violations are supposedly not
relevant to Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claims, the standards are relevant in proving
that such violations have not occurred. Such positions are discordant and ignore PREA’s
ultimate purpose.195 Inmates, in whose interests the law was enacted, have effectively been
equipped with a tool that has been severely hindered by many courts’ seemingly dissonant
interpretation.196 As illustrated by cases in which the courts have allowed them to be used
as a defense, PREA standards are of at least minimal relevance and should be made equally
available to both parties.
189. See Colon v. Kenwall, No. 1:18-CV-840, 2018 WL 5809863, at *1, *2, *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2018).
190. 34 U.S.C. § 30301.
191. Id. § 30302.
192. See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011), Hammons v. Jones, No. 00-CV-143 GKFSAJ, 2007
WL 2219521, at *1, *3 (N.D. Okla. July 27, 2007), Crane v. Allen, 3:09-CV-1303-HZ, 2012 WL 602432 (D. Or.
Feb. 22, 2012).
193. Qualified immunity is another such tool of protection used by prison staff.
194. Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011), Hammons v. Jones, No. 00-CV-143 GKFSAJ, 2007 WL
2219521 (N.D. Okla. July 27, 2007), Crane v. Allen, 3:09-CV-1303-HZ, 2012 WL 602432, at *1, *8 (D. Or.
Feb. 22, 2012).
195. 34 U.S.C. § 30302.
196. See Arkles, supra note 20.
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B. Standards Used to Assess Various Conditions Within Prisons
Other types of standards created and used by various correctional agencies have also
been used to evaluate unconstitutional conditions within carceral settings.197 While many
of these standards have not been approved or enacted by such an authoritative body as
Congress, courts have used them as relevant evidence in assessing the quality of mental
health care, safety, and living conditions in correctional facilities. 198
i. Mental Health Care
Courts have used various organizational standards to both assess and remedy the
existence of constitutional violations within carceral institutions, reinforcing the notion
that certain standards, such as PREA, are relevant.199 For example, in Gates v. Cook, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s order of injunctive relief which
required the correctional facility in question to adhere to the standards of the American
Correctional Association (ACA) and the National Commission on Correctional Health
Care (NCCHC).200 The ACA and NCCHC are non-profit organizations that produce nongovernmental standards.201
The plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, sued the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) alleging that many of the facility
conditions on Death Row were in violation of he and other inmates’ Eighth Amendment
rights against cruel and unusual punishment.202 The District Court of Northern Mississippi
found that several of the facility conditions constituted Eighth Amendment violations and
ordered MDOC to comply with injunctive relief meant to remedy such violations. 203 The
district court found that there were severe issues with the sanitation, heating and cooling,
pest control, plumbing, and lighting on Death Row.204 Furthermore, laundry was returned
unclean, inmates were forced to exercise in inappropriate footwear, and the mental health
care was “grossly inadequate.”205 The district court ordered that, to address the issues with
pest control and mental health care, MDOC adhere to ACA and NCCHC standards.206
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to comply with ACA and NCCHC
standards as to those issues.207
The conditions within the Mississippi State Penitentiary’s Death Row arguably

197. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004); Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2004).
198. Id.
199. Gates, 376 F.3d at 333–34, 337.
200. Id. at 342.
201. Standards
&
Accreditation,
AM.
CORR.
ASS’N,
http://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Standards___Accreditation/ACA_Member/Standards_an
d_Accreditation/SAC.aspx?hkey=7f4cf7bf-2b27-4a6b-b124-36e5bd90b93d (last visited Jan. 19, 2020);
Standards & Resources, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, https://www.ncchc.org/standards-resources
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
202. Gates, 376 F.3d at 327.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 333–35.
205. Id. at 335.
206. Id. at 336.
207. Gates, 376 F.3d at 340–43.
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rendered it unfit for human habitation.208 These unconstitutional conditions, such as the
lack of adequate lighting and sanitation, directly impacted the quality of the inmates’
mental health.209 The court found it important to note that, while “the Constitution does
not mandate comfortable prisons, [] neither does it permit inhumane ones.” 210 Courts use
an “evolving standard[] of decency that mark[s] the progress of a maturing society” in
order to distinguish inhumane from humane prison conditions. 211 The ACA and NCCHC
standards apparently demonstrated “evolving standards of decency,” which the court
found sufficiently relevant in drafting injunctive relief measures to remedy the Eighth
Amendment violations.212
The organizational standards in Gates were referenced in regard to remedying
constitutional violations, not necessarily to proving the existence of those constitutional
violations.213 But, by requiring the facility’s compliance with ACA and NCCHC
standards, one can draw the conclusion that a violation of those standards would, at the
very least, support a future Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment,
rendering such organizational standards relevant. PREA standards were enacted to
improve conditions within carceral settings and protect inmates from violations of their
rights, just as the ACA and NCCHC are committed to improving correctional
institutions.214 Similar to ACA and NCCHC standards, PREA sets forth “evolving
standards of decency”; PREA’s passage was written with the involvement of various
organizations, including correctional bodies, and its standards were enumerated less than
a decade ago.215 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged in Gates that “mental health needs are
no less serious than physical needs.”216 Prison rape and sexual assault and harassment,
which PREA standards attempt to prevent, disrupt both mental and physical health.217
Therefore, PREA standards represent an “evolving standard of decency” that is relevant
in assessing Eighth Amendment claims of sexual assault.
ii. Safety and Living Conditions
In addition to using organizational standards to assess the inadequacy of mental
health care within prisons, courts have also used them in examining inmate claims of
deliberate indifference of correctional staff.218 In Hall v. Bennett, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a jury could conclude correctional staff should have been
aware of a substantial risk posed to an inmate given the existence of the National Electrical

208. Id. at 327 (The plaintiff alleged that the inmates were “subjected to profound isolation, lack of exercise,
stench and filth, malfunctioning plumbing, high temperatures, uncontrolled mosquito and insect infestations, a
lack of sufficient mental health care, and exposure to psychotic inmates in adjoining cells.”).
209. Id. at 335.
210. Id. at 332.
211. Id. at 333.
212. Gates, 376 F.3d at 342–44.
213. Id. at 342.
214. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 201.
215. Gates, 376 F.3d at 333.
216. Id. at 332.
217. 34 U.S.C. § 30301.
218. Hall, 379 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Safety Code (NESC).219
The plaintiff was an inmate at the Correctional Industrial Facility in Pendleton,
Indiana, working as an electrician.220 According to the plaintiff, he was assigned to do
electrical work on live electrical lines without protective gloves.221 He was not a
journeyman electrician.222 The plaintiff experienced a severe electrical shock that traveled
from his left finger to his left knee, allegedly due to a slit in the protective insulation on
the pliers he had been using.223 He then brought a Section 1983 suit against his supervisors
Stan Russell, the plant engineer, and Allen Bennett, the foreman electrician, alleging
deliberate indifference and negligence.224
The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendants.225 The court reasoned that, because Bennett was an
electrician foreman, he would have or should have “been aware of general safety codes
that compel those working on even low-voltage circuits to wear insulated gloves,” citing
NESC.226 Furthermore, the court determined that a jury could find that, given the
defendants’ professional experience and their awareness of such organizational codes as
the NESC, they should have been aware of the substantial risk of doing electrical work
without protective gloves.227
The Seventh Circuit ruled that it would be reasonable for a jury to draw the inference
that the disregard of certain professional codes can result in liability. 228 As previously
discussed, courts have used the high occurrence of sexual abuse and harassment, which
occurs in carceral settings as sufficient to assume that correctional staff should be aware
that inmates are at substantial risk of such harm.229 PREA provided resources to BJS to
gather statistics, research, and data on prison rape, to assess the extent of and increase
awareness of the problem of prison rape.230 But, even if correctional staff should not
necessarily be expected to know exact statistics, they presumably should have some
amount of personal awareness of the issue, given that they are oftentimes either directly
involved with or on the periphery of the occurrence of the problem.
The subjective component of the Farmer test requires something more than mere
negligence.231 Therefore, knowledge alone that sexual abuse is a persistent problem within
correctional facilities generally is insufficient to satisfy the subjective prong of the test.
But, similar to the way the court used NESC in Hall, courts could consider PREA
standards in Eighth Amendment sexual abuse cases as supportive, as opposed to direct,
219. Id. at 466.
220. Id. at 463.
221. Id.
222. Id. (A journeyman electrician is an electrician, despite not obtaining licensure as a master electrician, who
has the training and experience necessary to work independently.).
223. Hall, 379 F.3d at 463.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 466.
226. Id. at 465.
227. Id. at 466.
228. Hall, 379 F.3d at 465–66.
229. Zollicoffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
230. 34 U.S.C. § 30303.
231. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–37.
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evidence of the subjective component of the Farmer test. Just as NESC informs electrical
professionals of precautions to take to promote safety, PREA standards offer guidance to
correctional professionals on how to protect inmates from violations of their Eighth
Amendment rights.
Moreover, in Hall, the defendants’ failure to supply the plaintiff with protective
gloves was in direct disregard of NESC recommendations. 232 The court’s reference to
NESC demonstrated that it found such organizational standards relevant in addressing the
defendants’ subjective awareness of the situation.233 Published and written by the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, NESC is a voluntary standard, which a majority
of the States have adopted as law.234 PREA, created by numerous organizations and
enacted by Congress, has been fully adopted by nineteen States, with twenty-nine
additional States, the District of Columbia, and four United States territories, giving
assurance of compliance.235
C. Professional Standards and Other Areas of Law
Not only have courts used other organizational standards to assess various conditions
in correctional facilities, courts have used professional standards in determining the
existence of constitutional violations.236 This suggests that, while such standards may not
be dispositive that a violation has occurred, they are relevant in assessing claims of
constitutional violations.
i. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims
The Supreme Court has used the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in regard to Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.237 Notably, the Court used the Model Rules in establishing
the test used to assess Sixth Amendment claims, in addition to using them in many other
legal contexts.238 Therefore, the Court has acknowledged the Model Rules, which were
produced by a professional organization and are not law, as persuasive authority. Given
that the Court has deemed rules written by a body with far less authority than that of
Congress to be relevant in addressing claims of Sixth Amendment violations, it would be
inconsistent for federal courts to not consider PREA relevant as persuasive authority in
regard to Eighth Amendment claims of sexual abuse or harassment arising from a prison
232. Hall, 379 F.3d at 465.
233. Id.
234. National Electrical Safety Code Adoption/Reference of 2012 Edition Survey, INST. ELEC. & ELECS.
ENG’RS, https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/2012-nesc-stateadoption-reference-survey.pdf.
235. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, FY 2017 LIST OF CERTIFICATION AND ASSURANCE
SUBMISSIONS
FOR
AUDIT
YEAR
3
OF
CYCLE
1
(2017),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/fy17-prea-certification-assurancesubmissions.pdf.
236. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
237. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
238. See George L. Hampton IV, Toward an Expanded use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (1991).
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setting.
The Model Rules were developed and adopted by the ABA, a voluntary bar
association, in 1979, to establish disciplinary procedures for ethical violations within the
legal profession.239 The use of the term “law,” in this context, is somewhat of a misnomer
though, as the Model Rules are not binding in the same way that a federal or state statute
would be, but allow legal professionals to regulate one another and impose discipline on
those who do not “maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct.” 240 Given the
gravity of practicing a profession in which a client’s rights and outcomes directly hinge
upon their attorney’s performance, such self-regulation is also meant to “protect the public
and administration of justice.”241
A violation of the Model Rules may not result in legal ramifications, unless an
attorney has simultaneously committed an unlawful act, as “[v]iolation of a Rule should
not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption
in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”242 The Model Rules are meant to
“define minimum standards of acceptable attorney conduct.”243
The Supreme Court has referenced the Model Rules numerous times to address
various types of legal questions.244 Furthermore, the Court has used the Model Rules to
make ethical determinations about the legal profession.245 This demonstrates that the
Model Rules, although not controlling authority, are given significant weight within the
judicial system. The Court illustrated the importance of the Model Rules when it made
direct reference to them in developing the Strickland test, which has been used to assess
ineffective assistance of counsel claims since.246
In Strickland, the defendant was accused of a number of serious crimes.247 Contrary
to defense counsel’s recommendations, the defendant eventually confessed, waived his
right to a jury trial, and plead guilty to all of the charges, which included three counts of
capital murder.248 Due to strategy considerations and for other reasons, defense counsel
did not gather character witnesses or order a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant.249
The defendant was subsequently sentenced to death.250
At the time of this decision, the Supreme Court had “never directly and fully
addressed a claim of ‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to

239. Id. at 657.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. MODEL
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT,
Scope
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_co
nduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope/.
243. Hampton, supra note 238, at 659.
244. Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 77, 79 (2007).
245. Id. at 80.
246. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (It should be noted that the Strickland test is not the sole precedent test used by
the Supreme Court to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims.).
247. Id. at 672.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 673.
250. Id. at 675.
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trial.”251 While a number of federal and state courts had adopted a “reasonably effective
assistance” standard, there was still inconsistency between courts as to what standard to
apply in ineffective assistance of counsel claims.252 In addressing this inconsistency, the
Court declared that “the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”253 In determining what constitutes
a reasonable performance, the Court referenced the Model Rules, as “[p]revailing norms
of practice [are] reflected in American Bar Association standards . . . and ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice.”254 Although the Model Rules are only “guides to determining what
is reasonable,” the Court explicitly sanctioned the use of the Model Rules to define
“reasonable performance.”255
As mentioned previously, the Model Rules were written by a professional body with
no legal authority. Nonetheless, the Court found that the Model Rules were relevant in
helping to fashion a constitutional test to assess Sixth Amendment violations. The Court
relies, to some degree, on the ABA to inform lawyers of what constitutes professional
norms. Furthermore, the ABA is able to adapt the Model Rules to changing norms in order
to revise professional expectations as necessary or appropriate. The Court’s deference to
an organizational body’s standards, such as the ABA’s Model Rules, demonstrates that,
while not controlling, such standards may be relevant in determining the existence of a
constitutional violation.256
Despite the Supreme Court’s setting out of a definitive two-part test, Justice
Marshall expressed concern in his dissenting opinion that the vagueness of the term
“reasonable” would undermine consistency within the lower courts as to what qualified as
ineffective assistance of counsel.257 Furthermore, Marshall argued that a standard of
“reasonableness” was too malleable and that such a term might result in rendering
successful ineffectiveness claims difficult.258 While the Strickland test has remained in
place, it has sustained criticism “for setting the constitutional and ethical safeguards too
low” and allowing deficient attorney performance to go undisciplined. 259
Although Strickland initially set out the test for assessing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its use of the Model Rules in later
cases.260 In Wiggins v. Smith, the Court displayed deference to the ABA Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases in assessing
“prevailing professional standards” in regard to capital defense work. 261 More recently,
the Court expressed in Bobby v. Van Hook that, in order to properly assess professional

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
See Roe v. Flore-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, T., dissenting).
Id.
Rigg, supra note 244, at 97.
Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
See generally 539 U.S. 510.
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norms, courts must apply up-to-date standards.262 After a lower court used the 2003 ABA
guidelines to assess an attorney’s performance in an eighteen-year-old case, the Court
reiterated that the Model Rules, while certainly relevant to assessing Sixth Amendment
claims, are “only [relevant] to the extent they describe the professional norms prevailing
when the representation took place,” emphasizing the importance of maintaining
contemporary professional standards.263
The Supreme Court expanded the reach of the Strickland test to include performance
in plea bargaining and attorney-client communications.264 In 2012, the Court decided in
Missouri v. Frye, that the failure of defense counsel to communicate a formal plea offer to
a client constituted deficient performance.265 Furthermore, in cases addressing
immigration-related issues, the Court decided that the failure to communicate the
possibility of deportation, which might accompany entering a guilty plea, constituted
deficient performance by counsel.266
While the two-part test may not result in a significant number of successful
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, some argue that the Model Rules are a sufficient
supplement, providing the Strickland test with “teeth.”267 Given that subpar performances
by attorneys may not necessarily rise to the level of failing the Strickland test, it can be
argued that use of the test alone is ineffective as a means of imposing consequences in
those cases where an attorney has merely performed poorly. Thus, the Model Rules are
not only relevant in addressing Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
but also create a way to impose discipline on substandard performances that do not rise to
the level of constitutional violations.
Unlike the Model Rules, which were made by and for a professional organization,
PREA was an explicit acknowledgement by the federal government that prison rape and
sexual abuse is a problem demanding a meaningful solution. Similar to the Supreme
Court’s use of the Model Rules to determine what qualifies as “prevailing professional
norms,” the Court relies on “contemporary standards of decency” for assessing Eighth
Amendment sexual abuse and harassment claims brought by inmates.268 PREA, by setting
forth the goal of reducing Eighth Amendment violations by eliminating prison rape and
outlining how to achieve that goal, is relevant in defining such standards of decency.
There is inconsistency in how courts define the objective component of the Farmer
test, with only some courts finding that both physical and psychological injuries can be
“sufficiently serious.”269 But PREA provides clear definitions of what constitutes sexual
abuse and harassment, and, by extension, identifies what behaviors are unacceptable. 270
Congress enacted PREA in 2003, the Attorney General disseminated PREA standards nine

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

558 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 7.
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
566 U.S. 134, 145.
Padilla, 559 U.S. 356, 384, 388.
See Riggs, supra note 244, at 78.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858.
Coker, supra note 86, at 451–53.
28 C.F.R. § 115.6.
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years later, and, in 2012, President Obama reaffirmed PREA’s purpose. 271 Therefore, the
courts could look to PREA in determining “contemporary standards of decency” with
regard to the issues of sexual abuse and harassment in carceral settings as its standards
appear to reflect just that.
Although Congress may have intentionally restricted PREA’s power, this does not
suggest that the standards contained therein are completely irrelevant to Eighth
Amendment claims, as some courts seem to have concluded.272 Even though violations of
the Model Rules do not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court has
nevertheless found them to be relevant in assessing Model Rule violations that also result
in constitutional violations.273
The courts consider the Model Rules, which were written by a professional
organization, relevant to Sixth Amendment claims.274 Given that Congress drafted PREA
with the assistance of many organizations, some of them professional organizations similar
to the ABA, reference to PREA standards seems relevant in addressing Eighth Amendment
claims.275
IV. CONCLUSION
PREA came into being over a decade ago. And it has been almost a decade since the
Attorney General published the PREA standards. Courts, albeit incrementally, have begun
acknowledging the gravity of the issue of prison rape, as demonstrated by the application
of evolving standards of contemporary decency to assess Eighth Amendment claims. The
courts appear to be responding to changing societal standards in regard to rape and sexual
abuse by adjusting their legal tests. Unfortunately, despite Congress’s action in
establishing PREA, the problem of prison rape persists at unacceptably high rates. It is
doubtful that Congress meant for this to be the case when it enacted PREA with
overwhelming bipartisan support, seeing as PREA’s express purpose was to eradicate rape
and sexual assault in any and all carceral settings.
Although the way in which Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual claims are being
judicially addressed is changing, PREA’s failure to succeed in achieving its ultimate
purpose is partially attributable to courts’ obstruction of the use of PREA standards. The
courts have made it quite clear that PREA did not create a right to a private cause of action,
but this fact does not provide a comprehensive explanation as to why courts have also
dismissed PREA standards as irrelevant to Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claims. The
standards were found to be sufficiently relevant in addressing Eighth Amendment
violations in regard to mental health care and safety and living conditions within carceral
institutions. Furthermore, the courts have allowed PREA standards to be used
inconsistently, deeming them relevant when applied by defendants, who are typically
prison staff attempting to defend against inmate claims.
Moreover, the courts certainly are not strangers to using professional and
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

77 Fed. Reg. 30873 (May 17, 2012).
The restriction of power refers to PREA not creating a private cause of action.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Id.
Arkles, supra note 20, at 804; Smith, supra note 14, at 11.
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organizational standards to assess constitutional claims. The Model Rules, which consist
of standards written by a voluntary body lacking any legal authority, have been referred to
as relevant authority in assessing Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. In a legal setting, it would appear reasonable to assume that Congressional acts
would carry more weight and authority than do professional organizations’ model
standards, such as the American Bar Association’s Model Rules.
Federal courts, if they are to be consistent and apply PREA standards in a way that
reflects congressional intent, should acknowledge that PREA and its standards are clearly
relevant in evaluating Eighth Amendment claims of rape and sexual assault in prisons and
jails.276 While PREA standards do not possess controlling authority, they do have
persuasive authority and should be used as such.
- Sage Martin*
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